Unjust Detention of Hashim Thaçi by the Kosovo Specialist Chambers

For many Kosovars, former President Hashim Thaçi is a hero of the independence struggle – his portrait still adorns buildings

By Expel Soros

June 2, 2025

For many Kosovars, former President Hashim Thaçi is a hero of the independence struggle – his portrait still adorns buildings in Pristina – yet he now languishes in detention at The Hague. Thaçi was indicted in 2020 by the Kosovo Specialist Chambers (KSC) for alleged war crimes dating back to Kosovo’s 1998–99 war. His ongoing detention is widely viewed as unjust, rooted in unclear evidence and a grossly excessive pretrial imprisonment. Indeed, after over 4½ years in custody without a verdict, even Thaçi’s own defense has decried the process as unfair . Thaçi and three co-defendants were arrested in November 2020 and waited 28 months before their trial even began in April 2023 . Such prolonged pretrial detention – stretching on as the trial continues – has effectively punished Thaçi before proving any guilt, flouting the fundamental legal norm of innocent until proven guilty. Thaçi’s lawyer, Luka Misetić, has publicly criticized the KSC’s case, stating that none of the witnesses heard over two years directly implicated Thaçi, and the prosecution’s evidence is “extremely weak” . Misetić even questioned why Thaçi was accused at all, given the paucity of solid evidence linking him to the alleged crimes . In short, Thaçi’s continued incarceration despite thin evidence and no conviction betrays a travesty of justice – a political detention in all but name.

Violations of International Legal Norms and Western Standards

Thaçi’s detention brazenly violates international legal standards that safeguard individual liberty and due process. International human rights law enshrines the principle that pretrial detention should be exceptional and limited in duration. For example, Article 9(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) specifies that “It shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody” ; in other words, authorities must justify holding an accused and should prefer release pending trial whenever possible. European human rights law echoes this: Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects the right to liberty and requires any detention to be necessary, proportionate, and reviewed promptly by a court . Pretrial detention spanning multiple years, as in Thaçi’s case, patently undermines the right to a trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. It offends the basic Western notion – rooted in Anglo-American legal tradition – that justice delayed is justice denied. In the United States, for instance, the Sixth Amendment guarantees a speedy trial, and the federal Speedy Trial Act generally mandates that defendants be indicted within 30 days of arrest and brought to trial within 70 days of indictment . Holding an unconvicted person for over four years would be unthinkable under such Anglo-American standards; it would trigger dismissal of charges for violating due process . Likewise, the presumption of innocence – a cornerstone of Western justice affirmed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – is effectively turned on its head by the KSC’s treatment of Thaçi. Rather than being treated as innocent until proven guilty, Thaçi has been kept behind bars as if guilt is assumed, deprived of his freedom and public stature long before any verdict. This disregard for the presumption of innocence and failure to ensure a prompt, fair trial stand in stark contrast to the legal norms championed in the very Western countries that pushed for the KSC’s creation. By these measures, Thaçi’s continued detention tramples fundamental rights and erodes the credibility of the court’s proceedings.

KSC Overreach and Undermining of Sovereignty

The Kosovo Specialist Chambers itself is a highly controversial body seen as overreaching its authority, lacking a true international mandate, and undermining Kosovo’s national sovereignty. Unlike prior war-crimes courts established by the United Nations, the KSC was not created by any UN Security Council resolution or international treaty. Rather, it was imposed on Kosovo through intense external pressure: Kosovo’s parliament was essentially strong-armed by Western allies into amending its constitution in 2015 to establish this “special court” . This foreign-designed tribunal operates outside Kosovo’s borders (in The Hague), with international judges and prosecutors staffing it entirely . Its mandate is narrowly tailored to prosecute only one side of the conflict (KLA guerrillas), and it exists solely due to Western insistence – not because of any domestic democratic demand . Kosovar Albanians widely perceive the KSC as an illegitimate imposition from abroad rather than a sovereign judicial institution . Indeed, a broad study found that an overwhelming majority of Kosovo Albanians believe the KSC was adopted “under pressure” from international allies and not out of Kosovo’s own will . This sentiment is shared even by Kosovo’s Serb community, which acknowledges that the court was “forced by the international community” rather than by genuine local initiative . In 2017, KLA veterans and many politicians attempted to repeal the law establishing the KSC, denouncing it as “discriminatory” and “biased” against Kosovo’s freedom fighters . Such backlash reflects a view that the KSC violates Kosovo’s sovereignty – it carved out a chunk of Kosovo’s jurisdiction and handed it to foreign hands. Notably, the KSC even has its own Specialist Chamber of the Constitutional Court (comprised of foreign judges) that usurps the role of Kosovo’s Constitutional Court for any KSC-related issues . Legal scholars observe that this effectively “commandeered Kosovo’s justice system” – the international community took control of Kosovo’s judicial process “at the expense of the Kosovar people’s wants and needs” . Far from being a hybrid partnership, the KSC is an “internationally dominated court with minimal local involvement,” a body that subverts the normal goals of hybrid tribunals such as local ownership and legitimacy . In sum, the KSC’s existence and operation encroach on Kosovo’s sovereignty, bypassing its constitutional guardians and popular will. It is perceived not as Kosovo’s court, but as an extraterritorial instrument of outside powers. This overreach casts a long shadow over the court’s legitimacy and raises the question: on what authority does a court with no broad international mandate and no local consent detain a former head of state for years on end?

The Soros Influence: Funding and Agenda Behind the Prosecution

A driving force behind the KSC and the case against Thaçi appears to be the influence of billionaire George Soros and his ideological agenda. Soros’s Open Society Foundations (OSF) have been deeply involved in the Balkans for decades, financing civil society, media, and justice initiatives in the region. In Kosovo, Soros’s network established a foundation as early as 1993 to reshape society along “open” (globalist) lines . It is no coincidence that Soros-linked organizations have been active in the transitional justice efforts targeting KLA figures. For example, the Kosovo Foundation for Open Society – Soros’s local branch – has directly supported research and projects concerning the Specialist Chambers . One such OSF-backed project helped “build knowledge” about the KSC and victims’ issues, implicitly bolstering the court’s narrative . More broadly, Soros’s Open Society Foundations openly boast of their support for international war-crimes tribunals and global justice mechanisms. OSF’s own history records that it “long supported” the establishment of the International Criminal Court and previously funded war-crimes courts for places like Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone . In other words, Soros’s philanthropy has systematically bankrolled the expansion of international judicial interventions in sovereign countries. This aligns perfectly with Soros’s well-documented worldview: he

advocates a “globalist” vision where national sovereignty is subordinate to supranational governance and liberal norms. In a 1999 essay, Soros explicitly argued that the Balkans should not be rebuilt on the basis of nation-states, declaring “the only way to peace and prosperity is to create an open society in which the state plays a less dominant role and borders diminish in importance.” This is a direct prescription for undermining traditional sovereignty and “opening” the region to external oversight – precisely what the KSC represents. Soros’s hand in the KSC can be seen ideologically and financially. The very conception of a special court to try Kosovo Albanians – instead of leaving war crimes accountability to Kosovo’s own institutions or balanced international processes – reflects the Open Society ideology that internationalized justice must override parochial national interests. It is telling that key international actors involved with the KSC move in Soros-funded circles: the Open Society Justice Initiative and related NGOs have been intimately engaged in war-crimes justice policy, helping shape tribunals like this . Through funding streams and ideological advocacy, Soros-world has relentlessly pushed for holding former KLA leaders accountable in a forum outside Kosovo’s control. This prosecution thus serves Soros’s agenda of promoting a particular narrative of the conflict – one that diminishes nationalist heroes and elevates a cosmopolitan, “multi-ethnic” vision for Kosovo’s future. In short, Soros’s funding and philosophy are key drivers of the Specialist Chambers experiment and Thaçi’s prosecution. The case fits a pattern in which Soros-backed elites seek to impose their brand of “open society” justice on resistant nations, using courts as tools to achieve political ends that Soros himself has championed.

Perceived Political Bias and Ideological Capture of International Courts

Thaçi’s ordeal highlights a broader problem: international courts like the KSC often exhibit political bias and ideological capture, skewing heavily left-leaning or “globalist” in their orientations. Far from neutral arbiters, these tribunals tend to be staffed by jurists and prosecutors drawn from a transnational elite that shares common liberal ideologies – frequently the same NGO lawyers, human-rights activists, and UN apparatchiks nurtured by Western governments and Soros-type foundations. The result is an echo chamber of globalist jurisprudence often disconnected from local notions of justice. Critics have long pointed out that bodies like the International Criminal Court (ICC) and ad hoc tribunals suffer from systemic biases. They disproportionately target leaders from smaller or non-western nations, while powerful states’ actors often escape scrutiny – reinforcing perceptions that these courts serve a political agenda. In Thaçi’s case, the asymmetry is glaring: a pro-Western, anti-Serbia guerrilla leader is in the dock, whereas individuals from the Serbian side (long backed by Russia) are largely absent. This pattern feeds the belief that international justice is selectively applied in line with geopolitical sympathies and an ideological aversion to assertive nationalists. International judges and prosecutors are also often accused of partisanship or misconduct, further undercutting claims of impartiality. Notably, one of Thaçi’s initial indictors at the KSC was American prosecutor Jack Smith, who later became famous for indicting a U.S. president – actions viewed by many conservatives as politically motivated. Such figures move in circles accused of partisan, left-leaning activism, casting doubt on their impartiality. The ICTY (Yugoslavia tribunal) – a precursor to the KSC – was itself beset by accusations of bias. A scandalous 2013 leak exposed that one ICTY judge, Frederik Harhoff, harbored a strong “bias towards conviction” of accused Serbs and was furious that some were acquitted . In a leaked letter, Judge Harhoff even alleged that political pressure from powerful countries like the U.S. and Israel influenced the tribunal’s decisions, leading to surprise acquittals of certain Serb and Croat generals . He suggested the court’s leadership bowed to those states’ interests to avoid setting precedents that could haunt Western militaries . In other words, behind the scenes geopolitical agendas intruded on the court’s work – precisely the kind of ideological capture critics decry. The ICTY’s own president dismissed Harhoff for his blatant lack of

impartiality , but the damage was done: the episode laid bare how ideology and politics trumped justice within that international court. Likewise, in the ICC, African and Asian observers have often complained the court is staffed by Europeans advancing a neo-imperial “human rights” ideology, while ignoring crimes by Western powers. It is routinely accused of politicized targeting – criticisms echoed now in Kosovo regarding the KSC. The Specialist Chambers is viewed as ideologically aligned with a liberal internationalist narrative that deems the KLA’s nationalist violence as criminal, while treating Serbia’s state violence with more leniency (since acknowledging it fully might implicate great powers who tolerated Serbia’s actions in the 1990s). This one-sided narrative dovetails with the agenda of global left-leaning institutions to cast all nationalist armed movements as suspect unless they fit the “progressive” mold. Even the procedural conduct of these courts reflects bias. Observers note that international judges often exhibit arrogance and detachment from local realities. Marijana Toma, a Serbian human-rights expert, remarked that ICTY judges showed “vanity” and indifference toward victim communities, behaving as if the tribunal “existed for themselves, not for the people” . Such aloofness suggests these courts see themselves as ideological missions rather than service of justice for affected communities. The KSC’s handling of Thaçi – secret indictments, closed proceedings, sweeping witness anonymity – similarly projects an elitist, unaccountable posture that breeds mistrust. In sum, international justice mechanisms are often perceived as political instruments steeped in a left-leaning, globalist orthodoxy. They are quick to prosecute those deemed enemies of “open society” values, while showing inexplicable lenience or silence toward offenders on the other side (or from powerful nations). This ideological capture erodes any moral high ground the KSC claims and vindicates those who say Thaçi’s fate was decided not by evidence, but by political bias.

One-Sided Prosecution and Double Standards

The case of Thaçi glaringly illustrates selective prosecution and double standards in international justice. The Kosovo Specialist Chambers’ mandate is blatantly one-sided: it is empowered only to investigate and prosecute crimes committed by members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) – predominantly ethnic Albanians – during and after the war . Crimes by Serbian forces in the same conflict are pointedly outside the KSC’s jurisdiction. This asymmetric focus was baked into the KSC’s creation (triggered by a controversial European report alleging KLA abuses) and has been widely condemned as “mono-ethnic” justice . Kosovo Albanian veterans and leaders denounce the court as inherently biased, since it targets the victors of the war (the KLA who fought for liberation) while ignoring the war crimes of the Serbian oppressors who instigated the conflict . Hysni Gucati, head of the KLA Veterans Association, has protested that the law governing the court is “discriminatory” – “the court ought not to try only KLA members but also Serbs who committed crimes in Kosovo,” he insisted . His deputy Nasim Haradinaj likewise blasted the KSC as a “violation of human rights” for being a single-ethnicity court that by design prosecutes Albanians and lets Serbian perpetrators walk free . These are not empty grievances. During the 1998–99 Kosovo war, Serb forces committed well-documented atrocities – mass killings, ethnic cleansing, rapes – yet relatively few Serbian officials faced justice, and those who did were handled by the ICTY in the Hague, which by now has closed. Many Serb suspects either received lenient sentences, acquittals, or never faced trial at all, creating a festering sense of injustice among Kosovars. By contrast, Thaçi and other ex-KLA leaders are now aggressively pursued decades later, as if to belatedly “balance the scales” – but in truth tilting them the other way. The leniency shown to Serbian perpetrators versus the harsh treatment of Thaçi is hard to miss. For example, Serbian ultranationalist Vojislav Šešelj spent years at the ICTY but was ultimately acquitted and freed, even returning to Serbian politics triumphantly – something unimaginable for any KLA defendant. Even Serbia’s President in the late 1990s, Slobodan Milošević, managed to stall and evade conviction until his death in custody. Meanwhile, Thaçi resigned his

presidency immediately when charged and has remained jailed without bail since. No top Serbian leader has spent a comparable pretrial term imprisoned for Kosovo war crimes. The KSC’s exclusive pursuit of Albanian suspects effectively whitewashes the Serbian side’s culpability, lending credence to claims that the court operates “to fulfill Serbia’s will,” as veterans’ leader Gucati put it . Indeed, from Belgrade’s perspective the KSC is a godsend: it criminalizes their former enemies and deflects attention from Serbia’s own misdeeds. That the international community chose to placate Serbia (which still refuses to recognize Kosovo) by setting up a court against the KLA, rather than a neutral mechanism addressing all war crimes, reveals the political calculus at play. The result is selective justice. As a 2017 public opinion study found, over 80% of Kosovo Albanians saw the KSC’s one-sided mandate as fundamentally unfair

– a sentiment that has only intensified as Thaçi’s trial drags on. In Kosovars’ eyes, their liberators are being punished while the architects of Serbian state brutality live free, some even still in power in Serbia. This gross asymmetry undermines the legitimacy of Thaçi’s prosecution. True justice would demand equal scrutiny of all parties, yet the KSC appears more interested in rewriting the war’s history to cast the KLA as villains. Such double standards validate the charge that the KSC is politically motivated – an instrument to settle scores against one side under the guise of law.

Ethical Lapses and Misconduct by International Court Officials

Compounding these issues are the ethical concerns and instances of misconduct that have marred international courts – including those handling Kosovo. The very officials entrusted with impartial justice have at times behaved in ways that call their integrity into question. These lapses further delegitimize the proceedings against Thaçi, suggesting that bias and impropriety behind the scenes may be shaping his fate. Consider the International Criminal Court: in 2024, the ICC’s Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan was hit with an internal investigation over allegations of sexual misconduct towards a staff member . This scandal, emerging from the world’s flagship war-crimes court, cast a harsh light on the internal culture of these institutions. If even the top prosecutor – akin to those who built the case against Thaçi – can be credibly accused of abusive conduct, it underscores a broader problem of accountability and ethics in international justice bodies. Likewise, the ICTY had its share of misconduct: beyond Judge Harhoff’s biased letter, other judges were criticized for conflicts of interest or unprofessional behavior. These incidents betray a culture of impunity and elitism among international jurists. There is also evidence of improper political entanglements. For example, the prosecutor who issued Thaçi’s indictment, Jack Smith, later became embroiled in high-profile political cases in the U.S., pursuing charges against former President Trump . Smith’s role has been lambasted by Trump and his supporters as politically biased – they accuse him of acting as an instrument of one political faction. This matters because it hints that the same prosecutor’s approach to Thaçi could have been colored by political motivations or ambition. It is notable that Smith’s indictment of Thaçi came at a moment when Thaçi was slated to visit the White House for peace talks – the timing effectively torpedoed that summit, a result that aligned with certain bureaucratic interests.

Such coincidences breed suspicion that Thaçi’s prosecution was strategically driven to sideline him

politically. Even the KSC’s judges face ethical scrutiny. The court has charged multiple individuals not only with war crimes but also with “obstruction of justice” for allegedly leaking documents or intimidating witnesses – including two leaders of the KLA Veterans Association who published leaked case files. While witness protection is important, the KSC’s zeal in prosecuting those who criticize it (the veterans) smacks of protecting its own reputation through fear, a dubious ethical look. The climate of secrecy and intimidation around the court raises questions about the judges’ impartiality and propriety. Are they running a fair trial, or a show trial where any dissent is criminalized? The vanity and insularity noted among Hague judges also hint at a lack of ethical humility – an environment where judges view themselves as untouchable crusaders rather than neutral arbiters. All these factors erode confidence that

Thaçi is being judged by unbiased, upright jurists. On the contrary, the impression is of a “justice” system rife with human failings – ego, ideological fervor, careerism – which prejudice outcomes. Such an environment can easily trample a defendant’s rights. In sum, the ethical track record of the international judiciary is far from pristine. Misconduct and bias among judges and prosecutors have been documented in various tribunals. This context reinforces the critique that Thaçi’s detention and trial are not the result of a scrupulously fair process, but of a deeply flawed system susceptible to personal and political agendas.

A Political Instrument to Impose a Globalist Vision

Taken together, the evidence is overwhelming that Thaçi’s detention and prosecution are politically driven and ideologically motivated – a far cry from a legitimate pursuit of justice. The Kosovo Specialist Chambers functions less as a neutral court of law and more as a political instrument wielded by globalist interests to impose their vision on Kosovo. Basic fair trial norms have been cast aside: the presumption of innocence has been effectively nullified by keeping Thaçi locked up for years without conviction, and the right to a timely trial has been sacrificed for an open-ended legal process designed to make an example of him. The KSC’s heavy-handed approach – lengthy pretrial incarceration, secret indictments, piling on new charges (such as the recent witness-tampering indictment in 2024) – conveys an agenda to break Thaçi’s will and tarnish his legacy before he ever gets a chance at acquittal. This pattern of overzealous prosecution betrays a presupposition of guilt, as if the court’s mission is to confirm the narrative scripted by its architects rather than to objectively weigh evidence. In effect, the KSC is executing the political goals of its sponsors. Those sponsors, chiefly certain Western European states and the Soros-affiliated “open society” network, have clear interests: to cement a narrative of the Kosovo war that places equal (if not greater) blame on the KLA for wartime abuses, thus undermining the moral standing of Kosovo’s independence fight. This narrative conveniently serves “globalist” aims by invalidating nationalist heroes like Thaçi and vindicating the international overseers who prefer a pliant Kosovo led by technocrats untainted by war. It also appeases Serbia (and its allies) by suggesting that Kosovo’s leaders were war criminals, thereby softening the moral case for Kosovo’s independence. The influence of George Soros in this equation cannot be overstated: his ideological blueprint of an “open Balkans” with eroded borders and weakened national leadership is effectively furthered by removing figures like Thaçi, who embody Kosovo’s sovereign resistance . Soros-funded entities have been instrumental in getting the KSC off the ground and in drumming up international support for these prosecutions . The result is a court that many see as carrying out Soros’s agenda under judicial guise. Even prominent Western voices have begun to question this charade. Richard Grenell, the former U.S. envoy to Kosovo, has lambasted Thaçi’s continued detention as a “grave injustice”, criticizing European leaders for acquiescing in this politically-driven prosecution . Grenell noted that for five years the West has failed to correct this injustice, implicitly acknowledging that Thaçi’s case is more about politics than law . He and others observe that the Specialist Chambers is undermining Kosovo’s stability and sovereignty by sidelining popular leaders on dubious grounds. Indeed, the KSC’s impact on Kosovo’s political landscape has been profound – in line with its political purpose. Thaçi’s removal from the scene (and that of other KLA-era politicians) has reconfigured Kosovo’s governance, something an objective court ought not aim to do . But the KSC’s backers do seek exactly that: a Kosovo where the old guard of independence fighters is discredited and a new leadership more amenable to foreign tutelage takes the helm. Justice, in the true sense, is secondary to this globalist vision. In conclusion, Hashim Thaçi’s detention by the Kosovo Specialist Chambers is an egregious injustice – a politically-orchestrated persecution dressed up as legal process. It violates basic international norms of due process, overreaches the court’s mandate, and tramples Kosovo’s sovereignty. It reflects the ideological bias of left-leaning international actors who have captured the reins of “justice”

to pursue their own agenda. And it starkly illustrates a double standard: harsh retribution for a pro-Western freedom fighter, contrasted with leniency or indifference toward the crimes of Serbia’s agents. The ethical failings and biases of the international judiciary further taint the proceedings, making it hard to trust the integrity of any verdict that may eventually emerge. Ultimately, the Thaçi case lays bare that the KSC is not a neutral forum but a political tool – one being used to impose a “globalist” reinterpretation of the Kosovo conflict and to enforce Soros-style ideological dictates on a proud, sovereign people. Such a court, ideologically driven and contemptuous of the presumption of innocence, cannot deliver true justice. Thaçi’s prolonged detention without clear evidence is a travesty that the international community – if it truly heeded the rule-of-law principles it preaches – would never countenance.

Lawyer Misetic criticizes the two-year trial process: The evidence is extremely weak, Thaçi lost many lives – Telegraph

https://www.telegrafi.com/en/Lawyer-Misetic-criticizes-the-two-year-trial-process–the-evidence-is-extremely-weak–many-lives- were-taken-from-Thaci/amp/

Kosovo: the masters of obstruction

Kosovo: the masters of obstruction

Toolkit: Applying for release pending trial – Fair Trials

Toolkit: Applying for release pending trial

Speedy Trial Act of 1974 — Dismissal Sanction for Noncompliance with the Act: Defining the Range of District Courts’ Discretion to Dismiss Cases with Prejudice | Office of Justice Programs https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/speedy-trial-act-1974-dismissal-sanction-noncompliance-act-defining

GO-HRE Geneva Office for Human Rights Education | Innocent